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The EU formally adopted new sanctions against Russia on 8 September which will come into force over
the next few days. Elizabeth Radziszewski assesses the role of Poland during the Ukraine crisis
and how the country’s foreign policy sits with the EU’s response to Russia. She writes that Poland
has taken on an unprecedented leadership role during the crisis, which could be enhanced by the
appointment of Poland’s Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, as the next President of the European
Council.
When the Euromaidan protests began after Ukraine’s government rejected the signing of an EU
trade pact, member states of the EU expressed sympathy toward the crowds. When Russia began
supporting the rebels in the eastern part of Ukraine in subsequent months, EU members condemned the move.
Overall, up until the imposition of recent sanctions, the EU’s tangible response to the tragic events in Ukraine has
been sclerotic and ambivalent.
Yet in the midst of the crisis, Poland, the EU’s sixth largest member, embraced what has seemed like an
unprecedented leadership role. Radosław Sikorski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, worked with Germany and France
to negotiate the resolution of the crisis between the protesters and Yanukovych that paved the way for new
presidential elections in Ukraine. Poland has also courted the United States in hopes of seeing NATO troops on its
soil in light of Russia’s aggressive policies. What explains this wave of activism and how does it fit into Poland’s
grand policy designs?
Ukraine in the context of Polish foreign policy
Poland’s support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and its closer union with the West, while notable, is not merely a reflection
of the country’s solidarity with a fellow democracy with which it also happens to share historical ties, albeit often
painful ones. Poland has done this before. During the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, the Polish
government spoke in defence of Georgia’s sovereignty. It was also a strong supporter of the 2004 Orange
Revolution in Ukraine.
But Poland’s foreign policy, oriented towards securing a more prominent role in European affairs while also keeping
close ties to the United States, is driven first and foremost by over-arching security concerns with economic goals
following close behind. Poland’s interests in bringing Ukraine closer to Europe and in defending its territorial integrity
are part of a consistent strategy of survival for a country whose sovereignty has been up for grabs in the game of big
power politics. Enduring partitions, German occupation during WWII and years of communist rule imposed on the
country by the Soviet Union, has taught Poland that sovereignty is not a guarantee. On the contrary, it can be traded
and moulded to the interests of the big and the strong.
The ‘loss’ of Ukraine due to the resurgence of Russia presents a paramount security issue for Poland. Poland’s
activism during the Euromaiden protests, its vehement support of sanctions against Russia, and vocal response,
have served as strategies to strengthen the country’s security position in two ways. First, by getting involved in
negotiations to end the first crisis and now pushing for a tougher stand against Russia, Poland has been working to
convince Europe and the U.S. of the seriousness of Russia’s threat to the stability of East-Central Europe and the
need to offset that threat. Second, its pro-Ukraine activism has served not only to rally support toward Ukraine but
also to highlight Poland’s leadership in East-Central Europe, therefore significantly raising the country’s profile in
Europe and beyond.
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These strategies effectively move Poland beyond the
periphery, making it a player whose voice may actually
count for something. The effective use of such soft-
power strategies has already brought some dividends
as is evident in two notable developments. First has
been the recent selection of Polish Prime Minister
Donald Tusk as the president of the European Council.
This role enables Tusk to help set the agenda on future
approaches to the Ukrainian crisis, mainly pushing for
greater solidarity with Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s
aggression while concurrently cementing Poland’s
significance as regional leader. Second, the potential
expansion of NATO’s base in Poland, driven in some
part by Polish activism in the region, could signal a
strong deterrent against resurgent Russia’s future
decisions about meddling in the country’s affairs.
The importance of security in Poland’s foreign policy is
hardly new. Poland’s post-communist foreign policy has
always been about ensuring that the painful history and
the curse of geography that placed it between two superpowers would not endanger the country’s independence. Its
EU accession, controversial support of the United States in the war in Iraq and the now defunct agreement to have
the missile defence shield placed on its soil exemplify the country’s wide-ranging and diverse strategies toward
fulfilling its security goal. Instead of succumbing to the realities of not being a major power and accepting its
unfortunate geographic location, Poland has found a way to be proactive about pursuing its interests. The
government’s activism during the crisis has enabled the country to emerge as a regional leader, a connector
between the West and the East in a way that would make it a respectable and significant player. And in the end, it is
that significance which garners attention and the ultimate prize of stronger security guarantees.
Poland’s activism during the crisis could, in the long term, also benefit the country economically, but the benefits
pale in light of security concerns. Poland’s largest trading partner is Germany and over 70 per cent of its trade is
done with EU countries. The potential to gain economically from a stable, democratic Ukraine exists. With a
population of nearly 46 million people and its geographic proximity to Poland, Ukraine could become a large market
for Polish exports. Long-term economic gains are likely now that Ukraine has finally singed the EU Association
Agreement that sparked the initial crisis. Still, without stability, Ukraine might focus more on dealing with pro-
Russian rebels in the east rather than demonstrating firm commitment toward meeting the terms of the agreement.
In other words, while Poland could gain economically from a peaceful resolution of the crisis, the benefits are long-
term at best.
In the end, Poland’s leadership during the crisis reflects its long-term strategic interests. While some may see the
country’s actions as surprising and unexpected, Poland’s vocal defence of Ukraine’s territorial integrity is not merely
reactionary but rather consistent with the over-arching goals of maintaining security that has been violated so often
throughout history. Today, Poland no longer has to worry about Germany. Conflict between the two is unthinkable as
both are members of the European Union and NATO. Therefore all eyes are on Russia, the resurgent power, the
country’s historical rival and the only serious threat. Thus, Poland will most likely continue to do what it has done
skillfully in the past: actively lobby the Europeans and the United States for the relevance, and thus security, of East-
Central Europe.
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